Author: Anton Giulio De’ Robertis – 03/09/2024
Panel July 25 9,00 am – 10,30 am
Chair Prof. Maria Grazia Melchionni Dir. Rivista di Studi Politici internazionali
Obstacles to Overcome in Building a New Shared Global Order
In Search of a Shared Legitimacy
Prof. Dr. AntonGiulio de’Robertis
The condition for the sustainable stability of a system of states is the engagement of the major factors of power on a common concept of legitimacy. In the present situation of the international system, there is an international organization – the United Nations – that would be the main source of legitimacy including the major powers of the system with the decision-making capacity regarding the use of force.
Yet, major problems arise on its ability to keep the stability of the system and to deliver the security it should guarantee to its members. That is due to two key shortcomings:
I) in contrast with existing situation when it was created, the Security Council – i.e. the body entrusted with the decisions about the use of force –does not includes today all major factors of power of the system;
II) even the members included in the body do not share anymore a common
concept of legitimacy.
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In fact the five permanent members of the council are lined up in two different grouping: three of them USA, UK and France are members of a would be regional alliance, the NATO, and meet regularly in the G7 format, extended well beyond the atlantic dimension; Russia and China are the founders of the BRICS, a format that, altough not intended to be an alliance, brings together countries of increasing economic and demographic and military weight and additionally is in a process of prograssive expansion.
The point is that although all these states are members of the UN and therefore signatories to the same rules of conduct of international law, in the two aforementioned groupings they adopt compartments inspired by different rules.
The roots of this partition and the keys to its overcoming lay in the history of the process of reconstruction of the European and World System after the Second World War and the Cold War.
United States and Great Britain, while the Second World War was still going on, laid the foundations of the international order that should have been established in the aftermath of the conflict. Churchill and Roosevelt with the proclamation of the Atlantic Charter already in August 1941 announced the liberal principles that should have inspired the international relations of the world once freed from the nazi threat.
Principles of an economic nature, but also political and, we could say, also organizational for that reference to the creation of an organization for global security mentioned at the end of the statement.
In June ‘44, while military operations, very demanding for the coalition, were still underway, in Bretton Woods began the planning of the financial and economic order that the allies, counting on victory, aimed to establish in the international system in the aftermath of the conflict. They thus created the conditions for a sound system of payments that would facilitate the resumption of international trade and a mechanism for financing the reconstruction and for supporting states in difficulty in dealing with the new monetary system based fundamentally on the dollar.
The further project of an organism that would regulate the freedom of trade was postponed, although it was considered an essential completion of the financial agreements reached between the general principles of libealism and the balance requirements of the economic systems of the countries concerned.
The birth of the United Nations, after the war just ended in Europe, extended to the totality of international relations the validity of the liberal principles, traditionally understood, sanctioning: the inviolability of the domestic jurisdiction of individual states; the prohibition of the use of force or the threat of the use of force in interna-tional relations; the respect for the principle of self-determination of people.
The attempt to create an organization for the freedom of trade was restarted by the United Nations, but after the inconclusive Havana conference in 1947, the matter was devolved to the GATT negotiations which would last for decades until the creation of the WTO in 1994.
The beginning of the Cold War soon limited the operation of the Liberal International Order to the Western world, which, thanks to the system introduced, experienced considerable economic development, and gradually extended the same criteria for political and economic action to the countries that were leaving the colonial regime.
With the Conference for European Security and Cooperation in the seventies, a dialogue was initiated with the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe and it resulted in the approval of the Helsinki Act in august 1975. It codified the principles of the liberal order that the West had been developing after the end of the World War and which all European states undertook to respect in their international relations.
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This initially formal adhesion of the Eastern bloc to Western liberalism favored that gradual evolution in the Soviet Union, which would have led to Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika. A further step towards the full extension of the liberal order to Eastern Europe came with the talks between Bush and Gorbachev between 1989 and 1990 which would have led to the reaffirmation of the principles of Helsinki in the Charter of the New Europe approved in Paris in November of 1990 by all European countries including the Soviet Union.
The crisis of the liberal international order begins with the abandonment by the United States of the policy of President Bush and his “New World Order” and “Europe whole and free” replaced by the line of the new president Clinton committed to the “Democratic Enlargement”; a formula inspired by a political conception widespread on the eastern coast of the States defined as “liberal”, but in a sense of intolerant and basically messianic progressivism.
With the presidency of Clinton and that of his successor George W. Bush the United States adopted a policy of both interference in domestic affairs of countries whose political system they did not appreciate and of real military action in the name of an asserted liberalism, that today we could more correctly define as neoliberal in coherence with what the then President of the Council of Foreign Relations of New York, Richard Haas, himself authoritatively claimed, in a 2017 article entitled “World Order 2.0”
This practice was interrupted by the Trump presidency, which at the moment appears to have been only an interlude with respect to Biden’s substantial eastern coast liberal victory.
In the face of all this there is the constant reaffirmation of the traditional values of the true international liberalism by the BRICS, expression of a half of humanity, that continue to reiterate in their annual summits the importance of the traditional values of liberalism summarized in the United Nations Charter indicated as the basic criterion of behavior in international relations regardless of the characteristics of the domestic political systems of individual countries. While the adoption of those policies of “democracy promotion” by the Clinton presidency and his successor George W. Bush, albeit paved with good intentions, as in the study of Stephen Walt[1], has led to destabilization never recomposed of existing, even if questionable, political systems and massive massacres and destruction.
The possible recomposition of such divergent political lines could occur through a return to the Helsinki act, on the basis of whose principles the Cold War gradually ended. The Helsinki act defined by Fareed Zakaria in his seminal article on illiberal democracy as “the most authentic expression of Western constitutional liberalism extended troughout the globe”. Its priciples in short are:
- the respect for the sovereignty of each country, its political system and its territorial integrity;
- the prohibition of the use or threat of the use of force in the event of international disputes;
- the prohibition of intervention in the internal affairs of other countries;
- respect for the territorial integrity of each country and
- the recognition of the right of self-determination of peoples for each nation on an equal footing.
On these last two points of the Helsinki act, an aporia arises and continues to arise due to the evident contradiction between the right of a people to autonomously choose its possible status of independence with respect to the state structure in which it finds itself inserted and the territorial integrity guaranteed to all states by the same document. So far, the legal paths proposed for solving the problem have not managed to avoid even bloody conflicts.
Without prejudice to the need for a solution to this aporia, the ten points of Helsinki indicate the essential principles of a liberal international order which the West drew inspiration from, until the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
The recomposition of the system could be perhaps possible through the recovery of the Helsinki points even in front of the profound divide that has arisen between the West and the Russian Federation due to the war in Ukraine, which in turn is also the effect of the aforementioned aporia, between the last two principles, and the repeated reluctance of a significant part of what we have already defined as the Rest, to side with the West in the various international forums in condemning the Russian Federation, The most important interlocutor of this group of countries is undoubtedly China, which through its leader Xi Jinping has expressed its vision of the international order in a plurality of documents and positions. The most useful for the purposes of identifying a shared international order with a West that had returned to the Liberal International Order of its origins and not to the neoliberal one (2.0) of Richard Haas are the Global Security Initiative and the Global Civilization Initiative.
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In the first of these two documents, a vision largely compatible with the original liberal international order is supported with the statement that “the various clashes and injustices in today’s world have not occurred because the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter are obsolete, but because they have not been maintained and implemented effectively.” Then, coherently with the Helsinki points in the document, it continues “The right of each country to autonomously choose its own social systems and development paths must be respected”, then always evoking in coherence with Helsinki “sovereign equality and non-interference in internal affairs as the fundamental principles of international law and the most essential norms that govern contemporary international relations. Less consistent with the liberal international order is the criticism and rejection of the existence of blocs of countries, whereas the existence of regional alliances had always been considered perfectly compatible with the United Nations system. The reference to the indivisibility of security then evokes a recurring motif of the diplomacy of the 1930s aimed at uniting the opposition of European countries to the threat of Nazi Germany; with the corollary that each country in pursuing its own security should take into account the reasonable security concerns of others.
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The compatibility of the Chinese position with the values promoted by the post-World War II liberal international order fades a bit by examining the content of the Global Civilization Initiative. It advances a conception of democracy that is somewhat dissonant from the one dominant in the liberal international order of the Cold War, even if the Helsinki act recognized each country’s right to freely choose and develop its own political, economic and cultural systems, as well as the right to determine its own laws and regulations. In fact, the Global Civilization Initiative states: “There are many ways to achieve democracy and there cannot be a cookie-cutter approach.” “China has not copied Western models of democracy, but has created its own. It is intrinsically undemocratic to use a single yardstick to measure the world’s different political systems. There is no “patent” on democracy, nor authorities that can decide who is democratic and who is not. The practice of fueling divisions and clashes in the name of democracy is itself a violation of the spirit of democracy.”
There is then a more general consideration which would have taken on a more significant value in light of the final declaration of the XV BRICS summit in September 1923. “We support the common values of humanity. Peace, development, equity, justice, democracy and freedom are the common aspirations of all peoples. Countries must keep an open mind in appreciating the perception of values by different civilizations and refrain from imposing their own values or models on others and from fueling ideological confrontation.” In his meeting with Xi Jinping in March 2023 Putin led Russia to substantially adhere to these visions of China as is clear from their “joint statement on deepening the comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination in the new era”. In this text which proposes the creation of a new era and that is of a new international order, the diversity of the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership is claimed from the traditional scheme of alliances, instead affirming its nature of non-alignment, non-confrontation and non-targeting of third countries. There is no outright condemnation of the existence of the blocs of the aforementioned Security Initiative, the existence of NATO as such is not criticized, but it is called “to stick to its character as a regional and defensive organization and is invited” to respect the sovereignty, security, interests and diversity of civilizations, history and culture of other countries, and to consider the peaceful development of other countries. countries objectively and fairly”.
More widely, they insist on observance of the objectives and principles of the United Nations Charter and on respect for international law, the irreplaceability of which is affirmed with the rule based order habitually invoked by Westerners, giving rise to hegemonism, unilateralism and protectionism. Instead, they hope for the advance of the democratization of international relations, globalization and multipolarism for the development of global governance in a more just and reasonable direction and to prevent any country or group of countries in pursuing their own military, political and other advantages such as may harm the legitimate security interests of other states.
Added to this is the statement of the great importance attributed by Russia to the Global Civilization Initiative and the theme of democracy is thus revisited, reaffirming the existence of different forms of democracy and denying that there can be one democracy superior to others. In consideration of the fact that countries have different histories, cultures and national conditions and that each of them has the right to independently choose its own development path, firm opposition is expressed to the imposition of some national values on others, to use of ideology to draw boundaries and to the hypocritical narrative of so-called “democracy versus authoritarianism”. It is also condemned the use of democracy and freedom as a pretext and political instrument to put pressure on other countries and interfere in their politics.
It was also emphasized that the realization of the enjoyment of human rights by all is the common goal of human society. All countries had the right to independently choose the path of human rights development. Different civilizations and countries should respect, tolerate, communicate and learn from each other.
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At the end of August the fifteenth BRICS summit was held in South Africa and in the Joannesburg Declaration, that followed, the five declared their common commitment to ensuring the promotion and protection of democracy. This term also signed by Russia and China took on a concept extended to the meanings supported by them and substantially accepted by the other three members of the format. Furthermore, in this final declaration the five avoided tones of condemnation and frontal opposition with the West which, despite its positions, had not spared polemical and alarming tones for the crises and tensions of the current international system. The BRICS instead reaffirmed their commitment to inclusive multilateralism and respect for international law, with particular reference to the purposes and principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter; defined as the indispensable cornerstone of an international system in which sovereign States cooperate to maintain peace and security, promote sustainable development, ensure the promotion and protection of democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms. The five therefore expressed their concern about the frequent adoption of unilateral coercive measures, incompatible with the principles of the United Nations Charter and generating negative effects especially in developing countries and recommended abstention in the future from any coercive measures non-compliant with the international law and the Charter of the United Nations. All this while avoiding, unlike what has been done in the past, expressly mentioning the sanctions imposed by the West on previous occasions.
The Ukrainian crisis was not ignored, however it was mentioned only once and on it the document referred to the positions previously taken by each of the five countries in the appropriate fora, including the Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly in which , apart from Russia’s opposition, there had been a recurrent abstention from the proposals put forward by Western countries to condemn Russian aggression. Appreciation was then expressed for the proposals for mediation and good offices aimed at the peaceful resolution of the conflict through dialogue and diplomacy. Regarding other more serious ongoing crises, the five said they were committed to supporting the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Syria, Yemen and Libya. The declaration reiterated the commitment to improving international economic cooperation and to adapting the bodies that ensure governance, such as the IMF, the WTO and the WHO, to the new dimensions of the national economies, which were part of it.
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On this point a first, albeit laborious, convergence with the Westerners occurred some time after the 2023 G20 summit in New Delhi whose final declaration expressed the intent to make global governance more representative, effective, transparent and responsible and to strengthen a quota-based and adequately resourced IMF. Also in New Delhi, as already in Joannesburg, the Ukrainian question was mentioned with a reference to the positions previously adopted by the individual participating states within the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations, as well as at the previous G20 in Bali. It was then reaffirmed that all States must act in a manner consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations and that in full coherence with it they should refrain from the use and threat of the use of force against the territorial integrity and sovereignty or political independence of any state. Finally adding the inadmissibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. More broadly, the G20 was an opportunity to verify the compatibility of the positions of the BRICS with those of the West and the agreement reached, however laboriously, on the final communiqué indicated the possible prospects of a shared international order, an order not as radically new as some would like or assert, but an order that recovers the wisdom of the past and places at the center the original principles of the post-World War II Liberal International Order, which with a terminology in vogue today we could define as a Liberal International Order 1.0. Principles better specified, as has been said, in the ten points of the Helsinki act which in the first point states: The signatory countries will also respect each other’s right to freely choose and develop their own political, social, economic and cultural systems, as well as the right to determine its own laws and regulations. The profound differences between the West and a large part of the Rest on the concept of democracy is a second aporia with respect to the order evoked by the act.
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The albeit problematic convergence between the West and what we have defined as the Rest, hypothesized so far, seems to be receding in 2024. The continuation of the Ukrainian crisis and the accentuation of Western commitment in support of Kiev, with subsequent steps of escalation in military aid, leaves a mark on global relations. The first evidence of the worsening of international relations appears in the joint statement issued in Beijing after Putin’s visit in May. Although initially the same concepts as the previous meeting were reiterated regarding the conception of international relations and democracy and the statement that Russian-Chinese relations were going through the best period in their history and that, although put to the test by the rapid changes in world, they demonstrated strength and stability. It was then reiterated that Russian-Chinese relations did not have a conflictual character towards third countries or a blockade, unlike the political-military alliances of the Cold War era, but envisaged strategic cooperation that gave rise to a new era.
An era of cooperation between countries that were not hostile either to each other or to third parties. But this objective appeared very doubtful in light of the serious concerns expressed by the two countries over what they perceive as attempts by the United States to violate the strategic balance to secure decisive military advantage through the creation of a global missile defense system and its deployment in various regions of the world and in space, which is occurring in conjunction with the accumulation of the potential of high-precision non-nuclear weapons to inflict “disarming” attacks ” and “decapitating;” with “joint nuclear attack” schemes such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) missions in Europe. Further concern was added by Washington’s intention to develop permanent missile weapons bases in various regions of the world. These extremely destabilizing steps, which entailed a direct threat to the security of Russia and China, were condemned in the strongest terms. Russia and China were thus induced to increase cooperation and strengthen coordination in order to counteract destructive and hostile actions and Washington’s policy of so-called “double containment”. Russia and China then declared their rejection of the creation in the Asia-Pacific region of closed associations and bloc structures, in particular military alliances and coalitions directed against a third state, asserting the negative impact on regional peace and stability of the United States’ “Indo-Pacific” strategy, synchronized with NATO’s destructive line in the Asia-Pacific region; also expressing serious concern about the consequences for strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific region of the implementation of the AUKUS (United States – Great Britain – Australia) project in all its aspects.
Finally, on the Russian side, a positive evaluation was expressed of China’s objective and impartial position on the Ukrainian issue, sharing its approach according to which conflicts had to be resolved on the basis of the United Nations Charter in its entirety and in its totality.
Russia welcomed China’s willingness to play a constructive role in the issue of political and diplomatic resolution of the crisis, noting the need to put an end to any initiative that contributes to the prolongation of hostilities and further escalation of the conflict, to avoid the transition to an uncontrolled phase.
It was then believed that in order to achieve a sustainable solution to the crisis it was necessary to address its root causes and respect the principle of the indivisibility of security in Europe for all countries in the region.
The indirect response to these last considerations came from the G7 of the following June. In their final statement the seven leading “western” countries, while affirming from the outset their commitment to respecting the United Nations Charter, also specified their intent to safeguard international peace and security by supporting a free and open international order, rules based. Rules whose compliance with the United Nations Charter was however questioned by many of the “Rest” countries. In fact a very revealing aspect of these rules was highlighted in the policy announced towards the Ukraine crisis. In fact the seven reasserted their policy “aimed at raising the costs of Russia’s war by building on the comprehensive package of sanctions and economic measures already in place”. In addition to the sanctions directed at Russia, the seven reiterated that, according to them, entities, including financial institutions, that facilitated Russia’s acquisition of items or equipment for its defense industrial base, were supporting actions that undermined the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of Ukraine. Accordingly, they would impose restrictive measures consistent with their legal systems to prevent abuse and restrict access to their financial systems for targeted individuals and entities in third countries, including Chinese entities, engaged in that activity. The practice adopted by the West of imposing sanctions, without passing through the United Nations, not only on Russia but also on those States and those “entities” that had not complied with their prohibitions was thus reiterated.
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The BRICS, the rapidly expanding format, largely representative of the Rest, in transition to a membership from five to nine, with the prospect of further enlargement, responded indirectly. Their foreign ministers, meeting in June in Nizhni Novgorod in preparation for the Kazan summit, objected that practice of the 7. In their final statement, they reiterated the positions already taken on the Ukrainian issue by each of their countries in the various international forums, and then they reapeted the concern, already expressed by he previous summit, about the widwspead adoption of unilateral approaches in violation of international law; referring specifically to the use of unilateral coercive measures which were incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the UN and produced negative effects on economic growth, trade, energy, health and food security notably in the developing world.
Unfortunately, it seems clear that the achievement of shared legitimacy in the current international system is still far away.