Author: Ecaterina Cojuhari – 07/02/2025
Apéro Géopolitique: “What is the future of Syria?”
The fall of the Assad regime could have profound implications for the entire Middle East, as it has significantly altered the ability of the major geopolitical players – Iran, the US, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel, and Russia – to exert influence. During Apéro Géopolitique discussion Ambassador Jean-Daniel Ruch who served Switzerland as Ambassador in Serbia, Israel, and Türkiye, being also a Swiss Special representative in the Middle East before, Ambassador Brunson McKinley – Diplomat at the State Department, Former U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, Former General Director of the International Organization for Migration at the UN in Geneva and Hicheme Lehmici – a geopolitical analyst, specializing in the Middle East, a lecturer at the Swiss UMEF, gave their vision to the most acute questions on the overall effects of the changes in Syria.
The conference took place at Chateau d’Aïre in cooperation with SWISS UMEF University of Applied Sciences Institute on January 27 in Geneva – Ecaterina Cojuhari, moderator.
The fall of Assad and Iran
- How do you explain the shockingly rapid fall of the Assad regime, and what is leading to?
Jean-Daniel Ruch: I think it was indeed a surprise for most of us.I’m not sure how much of a surprise it was in Ankara, Washington, Moscow, or Tehran – this is something that maybe historians will say later. But few things are clear. Firstly, the Syrian army was exhausted or had no morale, or certainly had no motivation to fight against the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham(HTS) rebels, who started to storm from Idlib, the northwestern part, touching Turkey. What I was told is that when they arrived in Aleppo, they saw that there was almost no defense, they were invigorated to go further. Eventually, they ended up in Damascus. How such a dramatic collapse of the Syrian army was possible, remains unclear to me. One day, we will know more.
The second thing is that the HTS people were extremely well-prepared. They were disciplined, well-organized, well-structured, and also well-armed. Now, when you live in a kind of enclave where the only contact with the outside world is through Turkey, you can imagine that there had been, of course, connections and support to build a very powerful and efficient army.
The third component – the traditional support of the Syrian, the Assad regime: Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah were, for one reason or another, weak. Obviously, they were not ready to come to the rescue of Bashar al-Assad.
- How would you explain that Iran and Russia gave up so easily on Syria?
Hicheme Lehmici: If we speak of Iran, firstly, I could say over the last two years, and in a clear perspective, it has been confronted internally with a crisis of governance or legitimacy. Also, the Iranian commitment in Syria and Lebanon was too expensive and led Iran to spend a certain number of resources that the Iranians would like to see invested in their country. So, the current Iranian regime has been weakened by this fact.
Iran is also aware about the American policy against Iran and it needs to secure its position with the neutralization, in particular, of the Gulf states. To be able to attack Iran, it is necessary for Americans to go either through their bases based in the United Arab Emirates, in Qatar, or from the Arabian Peninsula. So Iran must improve the framework of these relations, which has already been done through the negotiations that took place between Iran and Saudi Arabia with China as an intermediary. One of the concessions, and this is a hypothesis of analysis, would be to say that Iran has accepted the evolution in Syria by giving a kind of guarantee to the Gulf states for the great Sunni family. So the influence, rather Saudi, or the influence of the Gulf states was in exchange for all these countries keeping a position of neutrality in the event of an American attack hypothesis against Iran.
Other element to be taken into consideration is that according to some military analysts, during the Iranian attack on Israel, the Iranians have progressed in a rather surprising way, even shocking, in terms of ballistic technology, with the mastery of missile systems and hypersonic missiles. Iran today has a deterrent capacity with its missiles which is much stronger than the proxies it has developed with the armament of Hezbollah, or the presence in Syria, or even Yemen. Then there is a probability that Iran would be able to have nuclear weapons.
Regarding Russia: the Russians saw that the Iranians on their side were already starting to withdraw from the game. They also saw through their intelligence system, that the Syrian army was not going to fight in the context of an offensive of the Islamic groups of the North, but also those of the South, more specifically those that were monitored by the Americans and by the Turks, so HTS, Ayat Tahrir al-Sham, of Joulani. In this context, the Russians preferred to do what France could not do in the Sahel. At some point, when they understand that the party is lost, it is better to know how to negotiate, to withdraw intelligently, by trying to keep the peace, to do as much as possible, and not to get stuck in a position that in the end will risk leading to a form of humiliation, which the Russians did not do. In fact, we know that one month before the fall of Bashar al-Assad from power, the Russians were already negotiating with the Turks, with other emissaries, including Egyptian, Qataris, to try to find a way out and avoid a bloodbath in Syria, with a kind of transition, which has not been officially declared, and which avoided a new civil war in Syria. The Russians are now preparing their transfer of the military bases from Syria to Libya and Sudan.
American strategy
– Can you explain how you see the strategy of the USA in Syria and in the Middle East. Do you think it is possible that Americans will build a constructive relationship with Iran?
Brunson McKinley: I would like to present my framework of analysis in “Syria in Three circles”. The first circle is Syria itself. The second circle, the regional powers. And the third circle, the global superpowers.
Let’s start with Syria: in this patchwork of ethnic and religious groupings, the outstanding fact is that the Sunni Arab majority has defeated Assad and has taken over the government. This is very important and not often enough stressed. The demographics of Syria are significant: 60 or 70% of the people in Syria are Sunni Arabs. They won, having a very good chance of staying in power without having to resort to the manipulation and authoritarianism that characterized the Assad regime, which was a minority regime ruling over the rest of the citizenry. Of course, HTS and Joulani are going to have to modify their approach somewhat now. They come from radical roots. They won’t get the support they need to govern and rebuild their country if they stick to that line. They’re going to have to move to the center. The early signs are that they are already doing that. So, in the first circle, there is a new more representative majority in Syria.
In the second circle, there are Sunni Turkey, Sunni Egypt, Sunni Saudi Arabia, and Shiite Iran. The balance of power has shifted against Iran and pretty severely in favor of the Sunni autocracies. Israel is quite likely to be added to the mix because the Sunni autocracies, whether it’s Turkey, Egypt, or Saudi Arabia do not fear Israel. They fear the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, Hamas, the Islamic State and Iran, which supports them. So Israel can join this Sunni coalition. It’s what in Washington and Jerusalem call the Abraham Accords. And it’s very likely to become a reality in the future. So that’s the big picture in the region.
When we look globally at the superpowers of China, Russia, and the United States, we can see that the main motivation is the fear of war breaking out in the Near and Middle East. Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, none of them want to see a new general war break out in the region. It’s true for the regional powers as well. They don’t want war with each other if it can be avoided. But the potential is there. With a cornered Iran more eager than ever to acquire nuclear weapons and others determined not to let them do that. So if what I say is true and the three big powers are on the same wavelength in wishing to make sure that a regional war does not break out, they will start talking about that. If they have not already begun to talk about that secretly and quietly, in various places.
What are the terms on which a peace settlement between the Sunni coalition and Iran could be imposed? Iran would have to give up hope of nuclear weapons. It would have to give up its activities of subversion against its Sunni rivals. But there’s a lot for it in return. Dismantling of the sanctions regime would allow a kind of normalization and Iran to enter the market with its petroleum, which China wants to buy. Russia would be happy. It might get to keep its two bases on the Mediterranean. The US, which I think is likely to be driving this kind of settlement, would be very happy not to have to worry about Iran for a while because Donald Trump has other things on his plate.
Turkish ambitions
- How do you see the role and goals of Turkey in Syria?
Jean-Daniel Ruch: I think in this game, which looks a bit like a zero-sum game with winners and losers, Turkey is maybe one of the major winners so far in what happened in Syria. I do believe that there are two key objectives. The most important one is to remove what they perceive as a PKK threat, not a Kurdish threat. In Turkish terms, the threat is the PKK, meaning the armed movement, which has established itself in northeast Syria under the protection of about 2,000 U. S. troops. What has been a standing demand on the side of Turkey has been to create a 30-kilometer buffer zone within Syria, which would be free of Kurdish PKK or SDF fighters. So that’s one objective.
The second objective of Turkey is to increase its influence over the region, in particular over traditional areas of influence of Turkey. We are not talking about annexation or anything like that. This is really about influence. I believe that there are also some economic interests, in particular in Iraq, Mosul, and in Syria. The north-south corridor linking the Gulf towards Europe and Turkey could become an even more important hub for gas and oil transportation towards Europe, as it is already for the gas and oil coming from Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea.
Regarding Kurds, this is part of the new constitutional arrangement that will have to be found within Syria. We know that the HTS, this leadership has been duly briefed, and re-painted. They have sort of changed the software with democracy, inclusivity, diversity, and things that the Western ears like to hear. It will not be that easy to achieve this new power-sharing arrangement in a country where there is definitely no tradition of decentralization, federalism, or anything like that. First of all, I think it will need a lot of wisdom from the new leadership in Damascus, and not just from the leader, from his troops to live together with Alawites, with Kurds, with Christians, with the rules. So, the potential for renewed fighting between factions is extremely high. We see clashes between armed factions almost every day, trying to make this vision true of a new Syria based on the Geneva communiqué of 2012, enshrined later in a Security Council resolution. This could have happened 12 years ago. I was there; this remains the kind of roadmap that has been approved by the international community here in Geneva in June 2012.
The humanitarian aspect is very important, it is also bound or connected to challenges. One of them will be humanitarian assistance. I think 6.1 million people rely on humanitarian assistance today. It will be dependent upon the reconstruction. Who will fund the reconstruction? We hope that the Arab states and monarchies will fund the reconstruction. I’m pretty sure the Turkish companies’ construction are eager to receive the contracts. There was also that interest on the side of Turkey.
– You said that there is no question about the annexation of parts of Syria, but don’t you see the risk that with internal conflicts and external influence, Syria could be broken and taken piece by piece by neighboring countries?
Jean-Daniel Ruch: I see the risk that pieces of Syria will be under a very strong influence of foreign states like the Turks, obviously like Israel. I don’t see how Israeli forces can be removed from Mount Hermon, which is the water castle of the whole region; This is a more strategic asset. Of course, they will not leave it, unless they’re removed from here, receiving a super big price. But nobody has the power to remove them by force. I don’t think Turkey will annex Aleppo, or the Israelis are going to annex Mount Hermon. I think they have other important things on their plate, and we can maybe mention Gaza or the West Bank here.
Possible future scenarios
- After half a century of Shiite Alawite regime, Sunni came to power in Syria. Don’t you see the risk of a huge confrontation inside the country?
Hicheme Lehmici: The Syrian regime was based on a dimension of national unity, built on an ideology that exceeded precisely the ethnic and religious affiliations. This ideology is Arab nationalism. The Syrian regime was built on the meeting of populations who shared different religions. The problem in Syria today is that its allies, the allies of the Arab world, have come to power. These elements carry an extremist, religious ideology of a jihadist nature, sometimes a little more frequently through what is called the Muslim Brotherhood. So the place of minorities will not be the one that existed before. That is evident.
The victory of an Arab-Sunni majority created the risk that Syria would be divided through entities that would not be able to build a reliable national project since the national project existed on the notion of Arab nationalism that went beyond the ethnic and religious question. In the north of Syria, there is a kind of pseudo-independence of the Kurdish movements, that greatly disturbs Turkey and explains why Turkey intervened and why the risk of confrontation between Turks and Americans is grave.
- Can you share your vision of possible future scenarios for Syria?
Hicheme Lehmici: In terms of perspective, we always choose four or five scenarios. I think we’re going towards a kind of what we call a failed state, a bit like what Iraq is. A formal Syrian entity, particularly weakened, no longer has a real autonomous army, will be worked on by centrifugal forces to respond to interests linked to superpowers. Depending on the interests, but with more and more regional powers.
Another scenario could be the complete collapse of Syria, which explodes on ethno-religious, ethno-confessional dimensions. A Kurdish state is forming, an Arab-Sunni entity would attach itself to the Arab-Sunni of Iraq. And other autonomous entities, Alawites, would try to ally themselves perhaps with Russia or another power to remain detached and have their territory.
We can imagine a positive scenario of cooperation, that the great powers would offer Syria the possibility of finding the ground of a kind of great political agreement. We can imagine indeed that Syria would find certain stability through the economic path and investments.
Another scenario relates to science fiction, about the reconstruction of the old Ottoman caliphate and the idea that Aleppo, and Raqqa would be cities in quotation marks Turkish, Ottoman.
- Do you think that Syria can overcome internal divisions and regain its sovereignty or it is doomed to be a field of endless proxy wars?
Brunson McKinley: I think there’s at least a good chance that Syria will hold together because the most powerful faction is now in charge, and because the neighboring powers as well as the superpowers, will do all they can to make sure that is the outcome.
I think at the first sign of Syria splitting apart into confessional chunks or Mr. Erdogan deciding he wanted to annex Aleppo and recreate the Ottoman caliphate, a lot of serious pressure would be brought upon the interested parties to do nothing of the sort. I think the natural, logical, and also peaceful home base for Syria is part of a Sunni coalition and part of a regional peace agreement that could be made thanks to the changes in the power balance that have occurred with the fall of the Assad regime.
Hicheme Lehmici: To be very honest, the context in which we are now, makes me think about the crisis of multilateralism. There is too much interest in opposition. I think that the phase that we have just experienced in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen as well, in the Red Sea, is only a small repetition of the great regional cataclysm that will come in a few years. We had the First Balkan War a few years before the First World War. My impression is that what we are experiencing in the Middle East, is a small repetition of what has happened and that we have to expect a great regional war in the years to come.
Jean-Daniel Ruch: Of course, nobody wants a cataclysmic apocalyptic war, except maybe some Christian evangelicals who believe Jesus will then come back. This is a serious issue, because this eschatological perception or belief is present among 20 – 25 million Christian evangelicals, who voted for D. Trump. But also Sunni, Shia, Jewish messianism… The meeting point of all this messianism is between the mosques of the Omayyads and Al-Quds, meaning Haram al-Sharif or Temple Mount in Jerusalem. We just hope that common sense will prevail and that reasonable people will be able to defuse these risks. I think that one issue I would look at very carefully is the relationship between Ankara and Riyadh, between MBS and Erdogan and his team. They are really the key players there who can bring stability. And this is new in the Middle East, where regional powers have a high influence.